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1952

A GENERAL PROPOSAL FOR A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER

Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP79T01762A000400050001-9

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Section 1. General Criticism of CIA and its Role as a Coordinator of Intelligence

The Objective of an Intelligence Service

"Intelligence is an institution; it is a physical organization of living people which pursues the special kind of knowledge at issue. Such an organization must be prepared to put foreign countries under surveillance and must be prepared to expound their pasts, presents, and probable futures. It must be sure that what it produces in the way of information on these countries is useful to the people who make the decisions: that is, that it is relevant to their problems; that it is complete, accurate, and timely. It follows that such an organization must have a staff of skilled experts who at the same time know (or can be told) what the current foreign policy and strategic problems are, and who will devote their professional skill to producing useful information on these problems."

To recapitulate: A real national intelligence service is an institution of organized experts joined in the guided pursuit of that kind of knowledge which is essential to the solution of our current and future problems of foreign policy and national strategy. We believe that this is the single purpose and objective of any national intelligence service; we believe that this is its basic relationship to the government which it supports.

The kind of intelligence which an organized intelligence agency produces is essentially "ordered, useful information:"

a. "the kind a strategist must have to lay his plans and carry them out;"

b. "the knowledge which our highly placed civilians and military men must have to safeguard the national welfare;"

c. "the knowledge upon which a successful course of action can be rested;"

d. "the single best answer."

We believe that this "end-product" is the "raison d'etre" of any intelligence agency and that the quality of its production is the only legitimate measure of its efficiency.

Congressional Intention in Establishing CIA

With the approval by Congress in 1947 of the National Security Act, the United States for the first time acquired a national intelligence service with a statutory foundation. This Act, "in the interests of national security" and "for the purposes of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies," directed the CIA:

a. to advise the National Security Council in such matters of intelligence as bear upon the national security;

b. to recommend to the National Security Council measures for intelligence coordination;

c. itself to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate national security intelligence; and

d. to perform such other activities which might be directed by the National Security Council or which, better centralized, might benefit existing intelligence agencies.

It is apparent from the language of this basic mandate that the Congress intended to obtain through the operations of CIA the following minimum objectives:

a. basic informational support for the strategic policy-making agencies also established by the 1947 statute--the National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board;

b. coordination, i.e., the maintenance of order and efficiency, among the prevailing multiplicity of departmental intelligence agencies; and

c. a high-level, all-source intelligence service which, totally divorced from policy formation and implementation, would have the clearest possible claim to accuracy, honesty, and, above all, objectivity.

CIA's Performance

To what degree is CIA fulfilling these original aspirations? In our candid opinion, it has been a considerable failure as a coordinator of the government's intelligence activities, and it has itself produced an intelligence product which is not as strong, useful, and timely as it might be. The first deficiency is one in CIA's external relations; the second springs from weaknesses in CIA's internal situation. We propose to give some attention to the coordination problem in this section, and to explore the weaknesses contributing to a less-than-satisfactory intelligence product in the following sections.

CIA as a Coordinator of Intelligence

CIA's failure as a coordinator is not entirely its fault, for the National Security Act did not give it control over the activities of other intelligence services. From the terms of the Act,

CIA is not "central," but "peripheral," according to "the established gospel that national intelligence is a task far beyond the scope of any single agency." Moreover, CIA has been shy about asserting even those prerogatives which seem implicit in the Act. Making proper allowance for our deficiencies, we nevertheless feel that our five-year experience in "building a good intelligence service for the first time in our history" has expensively disproved the established gospel. CIA can do the job, if it is given authority and will undertake internal reforms.

We are fortunate in having at hand a classic statement of workable criteria of coordination, developed by a respected authority in the field of political science and specifically directed to the problem of intelligence coordination. In his view, the essential dimensions of coordinated intelligence activity are in substance:

a. in the overall field of intelligence activities, the establishment of clear-cut jurisdictions;

b. in the sum total of intelligence output, evidence of the existence of a mechanism for the "policing" of jurisdictions;

c. in intelligence production, the enforcement of standards of quality;

d. in production review, diagnosis of and correction of intelligence failures;

e. over inter-departmental functions, the existence of some centralized management;

f. among the respective intelligence agencies, the development of centralized personnel policies.

It is our view that any objective survey of the current operations of the multiplicity of agencies which are now engaged in the production of intelligence will not support the conclusion that these legitimate criteria of "coordination" are operative. A law which was based on the faulty concept that coordination is possible without control has compounded the confusion rather than eliminated it, and the primary intention of this legislative act remains to be achieved. In justification of this conclusion, we invite a review of the mere number of agencies which are independently producing intelligence information on all fields and widely disseminating it throughout the government in the form of periodic publications.

What are the consequences of this faulty law too cautiously exploited?

a. There is confusion, duplication, and poor coverage in the field of intelligence collection, with wasteful multi-dissemination of raw data.

b. There is duplication and competition in the field of finished intelligence production.

c. There is expansion of departmental intelligence reporting into the field of national security intelligence, accompanied by persistent temptations toward "imperialism."

d. There is a multiplication of "intelligence agencies" with corresponding inadequate utilization of existing intelligence facilities.

e. There is the absence of useful contact between user agencies and production agencies with corresponding neglect of guidance in collection.

f. There is competition for limited talent.

g. In the furor, there is deterioration in the end-product on all sides.

h. There is the over-all failure of CIA to emerge as a center of information to which all legitimate users might turn for guidance in preparation for decision.

i. There is, therefore, an awful waste.

Remedies

What are the remedies?

a. The definition of "national security intelligence" as that intelligence which bears directly upon the interdepartmental political, military, and economic policies of the United States with respect to other nations, excepting only that data bearing exclusively upon operations of uni-departmental concern or responsibility.

b. The granting to CIA, probably by amendment of the National Security Act, of exclusive jurisdiction over the dissemination of national security intelligence, with guaranteed access to raw data of national security interest, and with directional authority over the collection of all intelligence data.

c. The acquisition by the Central Intelligence Agency of "real coordinative authority," as previously defined, over the restricted "departmental" intelligence functions of other agencies.

d. The recruitment of personnel, either new or released, and their efficient organization within a CIA capable of fulfilling the requirements of national security intelligence collection, evaluation, and dissemination.

We believe that the change of administration which has occurred this year and the consequent necessity of finding a relationship to the new Chief Executive, the National Security Council, and the executive branch of the government as a whole, provides an incomparable opportunity for the Central Intelligence Agency to seek a legislative amendment, as well as to reorganize itself internally. The nature of this internal reform will be discussed in the succeeding sections.

Section 2. Organization

Critique of the Present CIA Organization

As an over-all judgment, it is our candid opinion that the Central Intelligence Agency as presently organized and oriented holds little promise of adequately fulfilling the basic intelligence function as outlined in the previous section. It remains something considerably less than "a collection of devoted specialists molded into a vigorous producing unit." It has not yet emerged as an agency of common and clearly definable purpose. Individual units have acquired, as we have been warned against, a "vested interest in some operation of forgotten importance." In consequence, we are failing to produce a product which "bears the unmistakable signs of superior research, cautious development, sound design, and careful production."

There is, however, no legislative obstacle to the Central Intelligence Agency's:

a. defining its objectives and purposes;

b. devising an organization with appropriate emphasis upon collection, analysis, and dissemination--and in particular organizing these services in support of each other and to the common objective of making intelligence known and useful to its intended consumers;

c. establishing a system of intelligence publications which is an effective medium of reporting;

d. providing the requisite personnel and facilities for each producing section, without which employees are defeated by sheer volume and confusion:

e. providing the physical surroundings which make possible maximum effectiveness; and

f. launching a real career intelligence service which would attract and hold the experts who are irreplaceable.

CIA's purpose we consider to be amply defined in the opening two paragraphs of this paper. We will proceed now to explore the remaining tasks.

Without discounting items of credit or ignoring the probable necessity for the Central Intelligence Agency to develop through experience, we would warn that palpable organizational faults have developed which, if they are permitted to crystallize, will seriously frustrate the utility of the Central Intelligence Agency as a national intelligence center. In summary, we would characterize the fundamental organizational failure as the triumph of function over area, and the isolation from each other of functions which--in terms of area--aremutually supporting. As a result, each function suffers in its performance.

a. It is true, of course, that within intelligence operations at least four specific functions can be distinguished: collection; research--including both general and specific; current reporting or analysis or evaluation--including spot reporting and the periodic survey; and prediction. (There is no logical reason, other than doubtful convenience, for the inclusion of certain other types of covert functions within the intelligence operation.) But, while these functions can be isolated, it is of elemental importance that they be not so isolated. They must all serve the single, common, and overall purpose of contributing to the total knowledge of any problem in national security or well-being. Ex-

perience has demonstrated again and again that the only practicable approach to the solution of intelligence problems is to organize these basic functions in support of the production of area intelligence.

b. If for convenience we consider only those divisions of CIA which correspond to the essentially intelligence operations -- namely the covert collection operations of FI, research operations in ORR, current analysis in OCI, and prediction in ONE -- we will find that the principle of rigid subordination of function to the common purpose of producing area intelligence has been dangerously sacrificed to the false principle of isolated function.

(1) FI:

(a) Its central headquarters is physically remote from the divisions it must logically support.
DDI

(b) While even liaison is a poor substitute for daily-working-together, there is no provision for regular contact between the working desks of the collection and user divisions.

(c) Although a system of targets is reputedly in operation, it is limited, inadequate, and notoriously inflexible. One important country of which we have knowledge houses hundreds of operatives but has not a single indigenous target.

(d) The prevailing system of spot requirements is so cumbersome and uncertain that it is typically utilized by the current reporting desks only in moments of desperation.

(e) The processing and evaluative organization within FI has no control over the kind, quality, and volume of raw data which it receives.

(f) Above all, being remote from its end-product and little influenced by its ultimate consumers, FI is notoriously developing a "vested interest" in the conduct of its operations and in the preservation of their security. It has cultivated a disastrous psychology among its employees that the operation, and not the product, is the important thing.

(g) Inevitably, therefore, FI is guilty of producing "useless intelligence" and of failing to produce intelligence which is useful.

(2) ORR:

(a) By its essentially topical and functional internal organization, ORR raises needless obstacles to its effective contribution to the current reportorial or predictive operation, and hence, to a common end-product.

(b) ORR, which should logically be CIA's general research center, makes no contribution on foreign psychological, sociological, and cultural topics equivalent to its production in the economic field.

(c) ORR has only an incidental current reportorial outlet and the contribution which it might make to the solution of day-to-day policy problems is therefore unnecessarily restricted.

(d) Being likewise physically remote from current and predictive reporting, ORR is also in constant danger of having its research projects marred by untimeliness and inaccuracy.

(3) ONE:

(a) On the dubious assumption that prediction can emerge in a vacuum, ONE has isolated itself from the other functions of CIA to a dangerous degree.

(b) It has too frequently failed to hold mutually advantageous consultations with those specialists more current in area knowledge.

(c) We seriously suspect that psychologically, ONE has rather shamelessly exploited a doubtful distinction between the isolation of a present situation and its projection into the future. Furthermore, we suspect that ONE exercises far too little care in unmistakably identifying its operations as projecting or extrapolating in this instance, and guessing in the next. Otherwise, we cannot account for the intellectual arrogance suggested by one proposed project: namely, the outlining of West German developments for the next ten years!

(4) OCI:

(a) With the superimposition of a global strategy staff of uncertain jurisdiction, it has distorted an essentially correct area organization and jeopardized the integrity of the area desks.

(b) It has greatly under-estimated its personnel requirements for the adequate analysis, evaluation, and dissemination of current intelligence reports.

(c) It has complicated its operations with the adoption of an exceptionally restrictive format for the publication of intelligence reports.

(d) It has permitted its control and editorial staff to assume substantive responsibilities.

(e) Organizationally and psychologically, its operations discourage rather than promote the development of area competence, individual expertise, and personal integrity.

(f) It has not yet firmly ascertained and established its audience and geared its reporting accordingly.

(g) It does not possess that research support which is essential to intelligent current evaluation.

(h) Its channel of communication with collection agencies is complicated, uncertain, and of doubtful usefulness.

(i) It has not organized itself efficiently as a center of information to which spot requirements can be addressed with the expectation of expeditious processing.

(j) Having no certain access to standing policy commitments of the United States, it is also therefore guilty of producing "useless knowledge."

c. To an obsession with the compartmentalization of functions may also be attributed the prevailing gross mis-emphasis within CIA upon the relative importance (and prestige) of these various functions. In the resulting "hierarchy," current reportorial activity has been sadly under-estimated. Yet, this function is at the very strategic center of any intelligence service:

> "The descriptive element of strategic intelligence...is the groundwork which gives meaning to day-to-day change and the groundwork without which speculation into the future is likely to be meaningless.... Practically nothing known to man stands completely still.... Knowledge devised to fit the requirements of grand strategy must everlastingly take into account this fact of change. Keeping track of the modalities of change is the function of strategic intelligence in its current reporting phase.... As the reporting element carries out its task it constantly adds freshness to the content of the basic descriptive element. It does more than this, for in

keeping otherwise static knowledge up-to-date, it maintains a bridge between the descriptive and...the speculative-evaluative elements...a bridge between the past and the future."

There are no "in-betweens" in a national intelligence service: either it is "good" or it is "dangerous." Whether it is good or dangerous depends upon the current reportorial staff who must not only:

receive, analyze, and evaluate the entire raw data production of all collection agencies;

but must also:

relieve all other agencies of the analysis and evaluative burden;

disseminate periodic, finished, basic intelligence reports;

importantly support (if not absorb) the speculative function;

give real guidance to collection agencies and act as the transmitting office between final consumer, the policy-maker, and the collection mechanism;

become the center of information upon which consumers confidently call for current intelligence summaries, spot analyses, and situation summaries.

d. Finally, given an excessive absorption in compartmentalized function, the danger is inevitably magnified that CIA as a whole shall forget that it is, in the last analysis, a service agency. It is not enough that we quite admirably avoid the pitfalls of policy recommendation: we must never forget that, to be of service, an agency cannot isolate itself from those it serves, their needs, their problems, and their requirements.

We hope that, in the foregoing survey, we have amply justified our conviction that the Central Intelligence Agency is in real need of a thorough-going reorganization, accompanied by a fundamental reorientation. As for the agency as a whole, we honestly confess

no competence in recommending solutions to problems which, in the process of such reorganization, cannot even be foreseen. But we do suggest that, in approaching these problems, the following guiding principles should in any case be operative;

(1) If central intelligence is to survive as a vital, important, and independent agency, it must assert vigorously its prerogatives in the field of national strategic intelligence.

(2) The present functional specialization -- with its concomitant imperial fiefs and compartmental iron curtains -- must give way to a united agency, organized to achieve a common purpose.

(3) We believe that that end-purpose must be re-defined as the production and dissemination of national intelligence reports on a current basis.

Proposed Organization

The organization that we suggest would bring together the personnel engaged in all the intelligence functions; i.e., it would bring together the specialists in collection, research, current reporting, and prediction. Moreover, it would bring them together on an area basis, since it is by areas that world problems are dealt with by the policy-makers. We would call this aggregation the Intelligence Office.

a. The Office would consist primarily of country units, staffed by trained country specialists.

b. The Office would be administered by a control mechanism consisting of:

a top executive;

a small hierarchy of regional executives;

various service or administrative agencies;

an intelligence staff of trained functional specialists who would provide guidance to but would not exercise line control over functional specialists assigned to regional branches; (As a starter, we would certainly suggest staff representation for a top-notch economist, international lawyer, geo-politician or geographer, sociologist, psychologist, political theorist, etc.);

a small board whose sole function would be the scanning of area reports for indications of hostilities.

c. Each country unit, under a desk officer, and subordinated to regional branches according to reasonable principles of proximity or relationship would consist of the following personnel:

country political specialists;

country economic specialists;

country military specialists;

country sociological, cultural, and psychological specialists;

country basic-researchers;

country situation analysts;

country long-range analysts;

collection specialist;

consumer liaison specialist (assigned to regional branches).

d. Each country unit, under the direct supervision of the regional office supervisor (who would receive advice and guidance from the Intelligence Staff working through the line staffs) would be responsible for the production of the following intelligence:

current, periodic intelligence reports in the political, economic, military, sociological, cultural, and psychological fields;

ad hoc situation reports;

basic research reports;

periodic long-range predictions;

spot-reports in response to consumer spot-requirements.

e. The current intelligence division would operate in accordance with the fundamental principle of substantive competence, authority, and integrity of the area specialist. Subject only to the direction of the desk and regional supervisor, the country specialist would be the sole judge of the evaluation, analysis, and importance of any given item of intelligence reporting.

f. Country specialists, together with the hierarchy of area supervisors, would be obliged to obtain agreed positions on intelligence interpretations in matters of multi-area significance.

g. The intelligence staff would provide guidance to -- but not control over -- the area hierarchy. The intelligence staff, operating solely through the organization hierarchy of area units, would perform the useful function of post-publication criticism -- including the detection of and the recommendation of resolutions for positional conflicts.

h. Publications "control" would be performed by a small staff of editors and reproducers organized solely as a service unit.

i. Among those administrative units supporting the top executive would be a division of consumer liaison whose sole purpose would be the ascertainment of consumer requirements and needs and the communication of those needs to the area hierarchy. A similar liaison unit would facilitate steady cooperation between analysis and collection divisions.

PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE OFFICE

Section 3. Reporting

Objective of Reporting

The objective of reporting is the conveyance to another of a message. Given the purpose and circumstances of delivery, that message should be the "full story" -- whether long or short, simple or complex. The determination of what is or is not a "full story" is a delicate calculation upon three variables: (1) the requirements of the reader; (2) the requirements imposed by the material; and, (3) since writing is "frozen thought," the requirements which originate in the writer.

These objectives, dimensions, and variables are generally applicable, and, are certainly operative in the field of successful commercial publication. Any number of better magazines and newspapers owe their success to the prior determination of a defined audience, to a careful concern for felicitous expression, and to a sharp awareness of the value of a sensitive expert "reacting" to the import of a new message. The London Economist, for example, discusses the problem of German unification when there is something to be said on the matter, and, with considerable indifference to the problem of length, interprets the facts in a pertinent manner. In consequence, the Economist has an established audience -- because it is accurate, its interpretations excellent, and, pre-eminently aware of the communicative value of style, it is readable. It is the conviction of the present writers that these principles are equally applicable in the field of intelligence reporting.

Faults of OCI Reporting

Aside from the unfortunately vague conceptions of audience, what other considerations have determined the format and the content of current OCI publications?

a. Pre-eminently, there is obsession with the question of length -- irrespective of subject-matter, and therefore, irrespective of reader, writer, and material.

b. There is esteem for the crisis -- an affection which is notoriously careless of material, and, of the policy-maker who quite legitimately may desire to measure the success of his career by the crises he has avoided through a timely awareness of a "situation" rather than by the critical moments which he has rather helplessly survived.

c. There is the injunction that every article must depend from a "well-understood peg" -- which results in false emphasis, and distortion of fact.

d. There is the aversion to the complex. The writer who must pretend that he knows less than he does likewise must assume that he produces for a reader incompetent to understand the complexities of matters on which he must render decisions.

e. There is the eschewing of public information, on the doubtful assumption that intelligence is "secret" information rather than "official information" on foreign areas. Given the avidity with which the world crisis is pursued by the press, the logical extension of the dual principles of "nothing but crises" and "no public information" would effectively obviate the necessity for any intelligence communication whatsoever.

f. There is the conviction that the "factual" is coterminous with the "dull" -- which, irrespective of what it does to writer and material, very quickly eliminates the "goal" of intelligence communication -- namely, the readers whose obligation to read is something less than enforceable.

g. There is the preference accorded to the "field report" contrasted with the disdain accorded to the insight of the analyst -- as gratuitous an insult to the profession of evaluation as can be imagined.

It is our candid view that these entirely artificial obstacles to good intelligence reporting are in many cases no more than engrained habit and perpetuated prejudice. In other cases, they are clearly attributable to the dictation of format and content by user agencies in ignorance of the needs imposed by the nature of intelligence. They are enforced by the numerous layers of substantive reviewers and compounded in particular by the "community review" procedure which emphasizes the "black and white" of world developments to the exclusion of the more truthful "grey."

Effect of OCI's Approach

In any case, the results in practice have proved highly deleterious:

a. As any analyst will confirm, the current intelligence bulletin, with its emphasis upon the short sentence, the clipped phrase, and the laconic expression, has a very limited use as a medium for the reporting of strategic intelligence. It is geared to reporting the isolated event, the crisis development, the obvious alarum, to

the exclusion of the solid statement of status, the interpretative comment, and the coherent analysis.

b. With attention centered on the bulletin, the current intelligence digest has become a repository of the trivial, the mediocre, and the rejected -- in the mass of which the solid item is submerged.

c. The current intelligence review, frankly devised as a corrective to the admitted inadequacies of the bulletin and the digest, is ironically sacrificed to the same doubtful principles which decree: (1) that, as another current periodical rather than a supplementary, expository report, produced as occasion demands, the review shall emphasize the sensational and the critical to the exclusion of the status, situation, and analytical report; (2) that, as a periodic rather than an ad hoc production, the philosophy of "production" shall also prevail; (3) that, as another report for busy people, the same limitations on style, expression, length, etc., shall operate.

Remedies

What remedies are in sight?

a. In the first place, we are relatively certain that a revamped intelligence agency producing basic intelligence for an audience several times larger than the one now serviced will of necessity be compelled to devise a reporting system which is more flexible than the prevailing one. We feel, further, that an overhauled agency which is producing intelligence for users we can clearly identify and whose needs are stated, will as a matter of

course eliminate the present obstacles to the "full story." The existence of a defined audience will furthermore permit that flexibility of language which derives from "competency communicating to competency." And finally, an organization of trained analysts, who are respected for their expertise, will be permitted that latitude of expression in which "crystallized thought" is meaningfully communicated to another. No single step could better improve our output than the removal of the battery of restrictions under which we labor now.

b. On the positive side, there are undoubtedly numerous "devices" which would go far to increase the accessibility of intelligence knowledge to consumer agencies. We urge, for example, the earnest consideration of a "device" which has been previously suggested by Mr. Donald Muntz and which is intended to release periodic publications from their current slavery to the idle repetition of basic situations and frequently inane generalities. As we have noted previously, the essence of current reporting is the "keeping track of the modalities of change." In other words, our coinage is the exchange of "manifestations" -- we deal with what alters, moves, develops. Yet, a vast percentage of our publications is wasted in the attenuated reproduction of basic situations which either do not change or change only slowly. Why cannot these basic situations be "stored," "preserved," and relegated to a convenient reference "library" where the unfamiliar may be consulted by the uninformed?

A solid basis for current reporting could be established by the prior depositing with consumer agencies of an "Encyclopedia to Current World Problems." This would necessitate the preparation by area analysts of basic statements of outstanding problems of

continuing interest, together with briefer statements of the current situation. These statements would be subjected to continual review by the analysts, and rewritten whenever necessary. Subjects could be added or removed from the Encyclopedia as the situation warranted, but the Encyclopedia would remain as a storehouse of what is vital, basic, and essential in each area of US interest. All current production items might usefully be referenced to these basic reports for the convenience of the consumer, and each current item might bear a serial number for the guidance of that consumer engaged in a comprehensive review of any given problem.

c. Relieved of the burden of the generality, the routine daily publications can then effectively perform the function for which they are intended: the communication of spot developments, as items of reasonable brevity, in a publication of manageable size. To perform this function, it goes without saying that such a publication should not be confined to the treatment of crises; that developments should not be twisted to "fit the familiar peg;" that complex matters, if susceptible to treatment in a short space, should not be banned; that public and "low-classified" information should not be scorned; that the entire publication and each individual item should be "readable."

(1) We propose, furthermore, that the bulletin and the digest be consolidated into a single publication — preserving, of course, the prevailing sectional division necessitated by security classifications. There appears to be no need for two dailies, and a consolidation would bring to light the solid Digest items while squeezing out the trivia.

(2) We propose that this consolidated publication of current intelligence be devoted exclusively to items of the so-called "comment" type. This will permit real flexibility in the exploitation of materials and avoid that unfortunate impression so prevalent among State Department personnel, for example, that our present publications merely are summaries of state cables. Most importantly, the comment-type piece will release the real capacities of the country expert. We are convinced that the unbroken expository presentation is the best medium for the communication of analysis -- the placing of events in perspective, the disclosure of relations, the assessment of importance, and the extrapolation of trends into the immediate future.

(3) As a concession to those who are nervous about "factual accuracy" and "source evaluation" we recommend that these matters be taken care of through a system of footnoting, copiously utilized. Such footnotes might also usefully serve as references for the identification of persons mentioned or the definition of terms which otherwise would disrupt the continuity of expression.

(4) We propose, furthermore, that certain steps be taken to insure the maximum useability of this consolidated periodic publication of intelligence items of top-policy, strategic, inter-departmental interest. As we see it, the major problems are, on the one hand, to bring to the immediate attention of the top-policy makers those items of immediate concern, and on the other, to alert intelligence consumers to specific information which, while of general interest, is in response to specific requests for intelligence guidance.

(a) The first of these problems, to which the bulletin is presently directed, can best be met by a simple "alerting" procedure carried out by the intelligence staff. To this staff would fall the daily task of selecting from each day's current production those items of top-priority interest and their one-sentence summarization. This summary would be attached, as an "Alert Index," to the current intelligence publication prior to its distribution to those persons or major departments responsible for immediate action in the foreign policy field.

(b) The second problem, which will arise from the emergence of the current intelligence publication as a summary of items of general interest, selected, however, partly in accordance with specific agency requests for intelligence information, can best be handled by the consumer liaison staff. We propose that this staff likewise prepare for the guidance of intelligence readers a handy "Consumer's Index" which will advise specific agencies that in the current release there appears an item in response to a previous request for information. The index would identify the requesting agency by name, the number of his request, and the page of the current intelligence publication upon which pertinent information can be found.

(5) We recommend, finally, the desirability of shifting the current intelligence review from a periodical to an ad hoc

basis, preserving the possibility therefore of its utilization in accordance with need and thus avoiding present time-lags and the pressures for "production for production's sake." (We may assume that, in a good intelligence agency, the analyst who is not writing is nevertheless still thinking.) Rehabilitated and recast as an ad hoc situation report, with entirely new vistas of style, length, and subject matter, the current intelligence review could become a powerful and flexible medium for making sense out of current situations, for disclosing trends in day-to-day developments, and for exposing in all their complexity and subtlety the multi-aspect bases of current intelligence events.

(6) As a supplement to the periodic and situation reports which we have suggested above, we further propose a wider utilization of special spot reports which, containing intelligence guidance in response to specific requests, but too specialized for general dissemination, will provide a convenient and fast channel between the national intelligence center and the numerous agencies having legitimate claims to intelligence information.

In conclusion, a note on two current problems:

a. We seriously suspect that the so-called "problem of continuity" is of doubtful applicability in the case of periodic reports of intelligence events. In the first place, an impressive percentage of the strategic intelligence reporting on a relatively full-coverage basis must inevitably relate to events which occur on a one-time basis, or, appear on the scene for a relatively short period of time, fail to materialize as a continuing problem, and

subsequently disappear. To ignore them would in many cases do serious violation to the alerting responsibility of intelligence; to "relate" them to previous, coterminous, or contiguous events (which would be required by "continuity") would in many cases attribute a logical relationship which by no means exists. In the second place, even continuous events appear "continuous" in such diverse units of time that it is next to impossible to establish their continuity in a daily publication. Continuity may be a yearly or weekly, as well as a daily matter; it will certainly not be the same in all situations. All of which, in the third place, brings us to the real significance of the question of continuity: continuity -- which is unbrokenness, relatedness, development, trend -- will be found in reports which fit logically into an understood general situation.

We suggest, therefore, that the real answer to the "problem of continuity" lies in the establishment of the "Encyclopedia of World Problems" (situations) which we have previously supported. The recipient of any item of current intelligence would have only to turn to the statement of the basic situation and current trend to acquire the complete background and context of any recent development. It would then no longer be a matter of any importance if the same subject is reported upon daily or weekly in order to fulfill the requirement of continuity.

b. Secondly, while we welcome the added importance which the "briefing" technique has recently assumed as a means of communicating intelligence to the consumer, the usefulness of this procedure will depend upon full awareness of its limitations. Formal, oral communication of intelligence invites all the dangers which we

have cited in the case of written communication -- over- or mis-emphasis, inadequate analysis, over-simplification, etc. -- and incurs additional hazards of its own. Since the briefer is customarily several times removed from the person of substantive competence, the opportunities for "misinterpretation en route" are numerous. The briefing then, while a useful supplement to printed intelligence, can never substitute for it.

Section 4. Office Staffing and Facilities

The Analyst's Need for Assistance

Most large organizations that are built around one primary skill need considerable support from other workers and from various facilities. Large outlays must be made, so to speak, for both "team and individual player" equipment.

In intelligence, the analyst is the primary worker, but he finds himself without the requisite assistance from other workers and from needed facilities. He seems to be regarded as self-sufficient. Nevertheless, he is expected to:

a. keep abreast of incoming material and to make a rapid disposition of it. Since the incoming material inevitably accumulates if the analyst personally handles those documents that are of no use to him, this capability implies the need of a preliminary screening.

b. locate any filed raw material or previous production in a matter of moments. This requires a considerable effort in keeping files up-to-date and in good order.

c. easily and quickly obtain abstracts of material. This indicates both the need for a considerable typing service, and, in cases where material to be abstracted is not concise but must be paraphrased, the need for modern devices.

d. compose efficiently, in accordance with his own working methods. This implies the need for the same kind of assistance which exists in the case of abstracting.

e. get finished production typed accurately and quickly.

f. have ready access to all forms of supplementary information, such as that contained in books, newspapers, and maps. Implied here is the need for a small library of materials pertinent

to the analyst's work, for bookcases, for clipping scrapbooks and personnel to keep them up, and for means whereby maps may be practicably stored and utilized.

Inadequacies of Present Staff and Facilities

The indicated personal assistance and facilities are at present available to CIA analysts on only a small, inadequate scale, or not available at all. In an integrated Intelligence Office, such as we have proposed in Section 2, the need for them would be much greater.

The question is simply whether the job in which we are engaged is thought important enough to be done right. It is obvious that presently OCI is on a makeshift basis, partly for reasons of economy, and partly because of its history. When organized in 1951, it was on trial, and was admittedly given a skeleton staff. The T/O has not been enlarged appreciably since. Furthermore, the original mission of its analysts was to provide simple, terse, and rapid treatment of outstanding daily developments on the basis of incoming material. No historical background was expected to be necessary, and files built up before OCI's organization were systematically destroyed (to our everlasting regret). The analyst himself was supposed to be responsible for only a "general knowledge" of conditions in his area.

Though the formal terms of OCI's mission and responsibility have not been altered, the practice today is vastly different from the assignment of 1951. Now, whenever official interest centers in a situation or development, the CIA analyst must be the best informed person in Washington, on the details as well as on the generalities.

To cope with this responsibility, the analyst requires a measure of non-analytical assistance, or he will be less effective than he should be.

A large section in OCI today is fortunate if it has one good clerk-typist to do filing, abstracting, clipping, screening, and routing, in addition to typing. (Indexing is not even attempted.) She is frequently overworked, or temporarily assigned to other work, and is inevitably absent occasionally on sick or annual leave, with no one to take her place.

In these circumstances, the analyst is expected to take up the slack, and to perform the household functions himself. For hours, a GS-11, 12, or 13 may be operating in the job of a GS-4 or 5. It is difficult to imagine professionals in the Justice, Commerce, or State Departments, or in private enterprise, being in the same predicament.

Recommendations for Staffing

We therefore recommend that each section, even as presently organized in OCI, have as a minimum:

A typist-stenographer (the large sections should have two); and

A clerk-screener, capable of acting as a typist.

The assignment of such personnel to even small sections would insure some back-stopping in the event of the absence or temporary re-assignment of clerks and typists in large sections.

The establishment of our proposed Intelligence Office would, of course, call for a reassessment of clerical and typing needs.

As suggested in his title, it would be the function of the clerk-screener to relieve the typist of her present duties of screening and routing, straight filing and tentative weeding out

of the files, and maintaining scrapbooks and map collections. He would also undertake to do valuable indexing.

While it is true that nothing in the files should be thrown out without the knowledge of the analyst, the chore of systematically combing them to see what might be discarded is something the analyst seldom has time for now. It would be extremely helpful to have the clerk-screener do this, with the analyst giving final approval.

It seems to us that everything possible should be done to keep the analyst at his essential tasks of reading, thinking, and writing. When the pinch comes now, it is the thinking time that is sacrificed, since, given the production philosophy, the analyst must go on reading and writing. There is a good deal more need for thinking than for writing.

Recommendations for Facilities

In the matter of facilities, it is apparent that if the analyst must be completely informed on topics assigned to him, he must have complete files. These are now denied to him, not only because of the inadequate clerk corps, but also because of the limitation on the number of safes. Old cables and documents are now regularly discarded (on the basis of age) to make room for new, in the hope that they won't be needed; then, the next week the analyst is asked to trace the development of a situation over the past seven years, having nothing but his memory to fall back on!

Clearly, the analyst should be granted safe accomodations for all material that he feels may be useful.

In the process of composing articles, the analyst today must either write in long-hand or type, something at which few analysts are proficient. These methods, laborious and stultifying to many people, have long been superseded in private enterprise, and to a large extent in government. Many people do not write or type fast enough to maintain continuity of their ideas. The agency would more fully exploit the capacities of many of its employees if it made it possible for them to dictate to a stenographer or to use a dictaphone. The dictaphone, incidentally, would be enormously useful in making paraphrases of material for filing when the gist was not sufficiently condensed.

Finally, a plea must be made for adequate reference material, and for methods of storing it in an accessible repository. It is certainly apparent that the library is no substitute for a small collection of books in each section, and the most useful library books are "always" out on loan. Present policies discourage the purchase of books; even if a section could get them, it has no bookcases, and security regulations frown on the storage of anything on desk tops.

A file of clippings of newspaper articles is essential to section operations; yet again there is no proper place to store a large-sized scrapbook (nor personnel with time enough to maintain the book). More and larger file cabinets are needed, not only for scrapbooks but for other bulky unclassified material.

Presently -- and usually against some regulation -- a few maps are hung on the wall, but there is no room for the large-scale maps which are often indispensible. They must be stored and examined

on the floor! Surely there is little reason why CIA cannot have vertical map frames which are used in schools, museums, and large libraries. It must be emphasized that these hindrances to quick ascertainment of facts often have a damaging effect on intelligence production.

Though a beginning should be made, we recognize that the whole problem of adequate facilities cannot be solved while CIA is housed in its present quarters. There is simply not space for all the safes, bookcases, etc., that are needed. The question of the physical plant is therefore discussed in the next section.

Section 5. Intelligence Headquarters

The woeful inadequacy of the physical plant presently at the disposal of the Central Intelligence Agency is so well understood that it would be gratuitous to belabor the point. We plead here the cause for more adequate facilities because we regard the present plant as symptomatic of our difficulties and as a definite obstacle to their resolution.

Psychologically, the shabby structures which we occupy inevitably impress insider and outsider with the "temporariness" of the operations we perform. Our "temporary" buildings are a continuing negation of the fact that we are an agency with a legislative mandate which implies that we are permanent. They suggest that we are on trial. They suggest an absence of prestige. They do, in fact, detract from the product by which we should solely be judged.

Physically, they impose the severest sort of handicaps upon maximum output with maximum efficiency. They are appallingly unattractive and operate according to minimum standards of comfort.

Noisy and overcrowded, they preclude that sort of concentrated effort which, in our view, is the precondition for the production of sound thought. Professional men everywhere consider that a personal room or cubicle is a sine qua non of production.

Administratively, these far-flung buildings are a major obstacle to coordinated and cooperative operations which are the groundwork for a superlative intelligence product. Physical remoteness places a severe strain on control -- it prevents working together. The individual capacities and talents of each agency

employee are useful to his fellow employee -- but not if they are so distant from each other that each in fact operates in isolation.

Financially, we are certain that, in the long run, those physical handicaps to sound operations are very expensive.

If we are to have a "new agency," an institution of competent experts, dedicated to the production of that vital knowledge upon which the security of the nation will rest -- then we need the kind of plant which will help rather than hinder its efforts.

Section 6. Career Intelligence

Why a Career Program?

The experience of government in modern and complex society has clearly defined those circumstances under which it becomes institutionally more efficient, if not absolutely necessary, to conduct an official activity on a professional and career basis. In general, these circumstances exist when:

a. the talents and skills required demand interference in and a certain guidance of the pre-employment training of prospective employees;

b. the degree of specialization of operations demands a considerable investment in post-employment training of recruited personnel;

c. when the efficiency of any given employee becomes proportionate to the acquisition of experience -- frequently long, laborious, and highly technical;

d. when meritorious performance of the function as a whole is dependent upon the commandeering of such a significant portion of a man's or woman's life that an institutional responsibility exists for the general welfare and well-being of that man or women;

e. when individual jobs become so specialized -- and therefore stigmatized -- that a loss of employment implies a long period of "technological unemployment" and difficult adjustment for those persons whose association with the activity in question has been extended.

"Career Service" in CIA

It is high time, in the view of the authors of this study, that the Central Intelligence Agency face up to the necessities and to the responsibilities which the existence of these very circumstances in its own operations is now rapidly imposing. There are few among us who, for the most part having stumbled into the Central Intelligence Agency, are not subsequently aware of pre-employment training and experience which would have served us and the agency well. There are few who are not willing under appropriate circumstances of continuing salaries and certainty of employment, to undertake extensive periods of post-employment training intended better to fit us for our jobs. There are numerous positions where the increase in personal competency is a consequence of experience over a considerable period of time in a specific subject matter. There are many of us, who, having been employed for several years in the intelligence field, are appalled by the degree of its specialization and the diminishing transferability of the kind of experience, knowledge, and reputation which we have acquired. We have quite legitimate fears that, having set a course, there are few alternatives, and no turning back.

Whether we like it or not, the intelligence officer becomes a "professional." The Central Intelligence Agency owes it to itself and to its professionals to insure the continuing feasibility and desirability of capable and respectable employees to devote their talents to the intelligence field. Without such insurance, we are certain that the kind of national intelligence center which we

envisaged will be enormously handicapped by the unavailability of those experts who can in turn insure a product of utmost reliability and insight.

Deficiencies in CIA Personnel Policies

We detect the first evidence that CIA has not yet realized its professional nature in the tendency of the agency to recruit the youthful and adventuresome, without supplying a sufficient core of the highly-trained and mature. We have not yet offered those attractions, particularly of salary, which would bring to intelligence the wisdom and insight which come from experience. We have tended to depend upon a mass community product, relying upon duplication to expose and correct errors. As a haven for beginners rather than a goal for experts, we have remained regrettably amateurish.

There is no reflection here on those numerous and earnest "youngsters" among whom we count ourselves; but we are aware of our own limitations, and therefore of the limitations of our product. We plead for the guidance of the highly knowledgeable, the opportunity to improve our talents by association with them, and the assurance that having acquired that experience and training which establishes some claim to real expertise there will be rewards for our efforts.

A second evidence of the lack of a full appreciation of the professional nature of intelligence is the concentration of in-training programs on the collection phase of intelligence. If

there is any cause that we have intended to plead, it is that of a wider conception of intelligence. From that broader perspective, collection is only at the beginning of intelligence. Granted the need for training agents, is there not also the need for training analysts?

Problems of a Career Service in Intelligence

a. Financial Reward. As for making intelligence as attractive a profession as others, it must be recognized that the intelligence officer completely lacks the opportunities to reach the level of income enjoyed by lawyers, doctors, and engineers.

b. Social Importance and Prestige. Despite the obvious importance of a profession aimed at assisting the formulation of the nation's foreign policies, and therefore of promoting the national security, the intelligence officer's sense of this importance and his prestige are damaged in several ways. His awareness of the deficiencies of the product and of the difficulty which intelligence encounters in having an impact on policy-formulation makes him sensitive to the attitude of laymen that intelligence is the "WPA of the 1950's." Furthermore, those employed on the "covert" side cannot acknowledge their membership in the profession.

c. The Satisfaction of the Job. Though it is true that many of us have come into CIA more or less through accident, it is also true that most of us take a real pleasure in the job. The principal drawback is the almost certain knowledge that our handiwork, however, however painstakingly done, will be disassembled and rebuilt. We then have little of the incentive of other professionals

to "put the best of ourselves" into work which we can recogonize as "our own."

d. Security. Reasonable conditions of job security presently obtain in CIA, though it must be pointed out that the possibility of remaining on the job involves not only simple protection but promotion opportunities as well.

Recommendations

For the purpose of recruiting qualified personnel, continuing their training, and creating those essential characteristics of an attractiveness in the profession, we suggest that CIA:

a. Seek to have several universities set up undergraduate courses specifically to provide the general training which is desirable for all intelligence officers. There is no problem of security here any more than there is in the case of training for the diplomatic service, whose operations are confidential. This move, however, would establish the intelligence profession as a separate and respectable occupational target.

b. Seek legislation establishing an Intelligence Service composed of a corps of intelligence officers. This law would parallel the Rogers Act setting up the Foreign Service.

c. Generalize the in-training program, not to the exclusion of "agent training," but in the direction of providing training in the specialties of research, analysis, prediction, etc., which we frankly consider more important.

d. Set up an out-training program, so that CIA employees may receive appropriate additional education at universities and elsewhere.

e. Expand the intra-agency rotational program on a voluntary basis.

f. Liberalize the foreign residence and travel programs to give headquarters personnel current experience in the area of their specialization.

g. Establish a system of proper and appropriate non-material incentives.

h. To place the social importance of the profession beyond question, to establish the prestige of the service and the individual officer, and to set a new valuation on the work of the individual, adopt these reforms of organization, reporting, and physical plant which we have previously recommended.

i. For the protection of the individual and the agency, seriously consider a rigorous policy of "promotion up, or out."